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ADDISON'S MASTERY OF LOCKE
William Walker

fter considering Paradise Lost under the Aristotelean
categories of plot, character, thought, and diction,
Addison pauses in the fifth essay he devotes to this
poem to present some general speculations concerning
the "Man who sets up for a Judge in Criticism."* That such a man must
have "a clear and Logical Head" is, for Addison, evident from the fact
that "Aristotle, who was the best Critick, was also one of the best
Logicians that ever appeared in the World" (3: 35). And it is because a
clear and logical head is one of the things a man setting himself up as a
judge of literature needs that, as Addison goes on to observe, he would
do well to master the most authoritative epistemological work of the
Restoration:
Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding would be
thought a very odd Book for a Man to make himself Master
of, who would get a Reputation by Critical Writings; though
at the same time it is very certain, that an Author who has
not learn'd the Art of distinguishing between Words and
Things, and of ranging his Thoughts, and setting them in
proper Lights, whatever Notions he may have, will lose
himself in Confusion and Obscurity. (3: 36)

' The Spectator, ed. Donald Bond, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965) 3: 35. All
further references are to this edition and are included in brackets in the text.
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While, for Addison, Aristotle's writing is proof that the good critic
must be a good logician, Locke's epistemological writing is a means by
which a man may become a good logician. Having mastered Locke's
epistemology, a man will have a clear and logical head and will
therefore be able to distinguish between words and things, organize his
thoughts, and present them clearly to others. In short, by mastering
Locke's Essay, a man will have qualified himself to fulfill several of the
major tasks of criticism.
In making such strong claims for the value of mastering Locke's
Essay, Addison appears to be speaking from experience and thus
implicitly asserting that he himself has done so. That this is indeed the
case is one of the central observations of the commentary devoted to
his Spectator essays, especially those on the pleasures of the imagination.
This mastery, however, is generally understood as Addison's simple
adoption or expression of Lockean epistemology. In the only major
study of The Spectator in the eighties, for example, Michael Ketcham
claims that "the style of the Essay is the popular style of The Spectator,
and its epistemology is that of The Spectator." In a more recent major
study devoted to this periodical, Brian McCrea claims that in dealing
with Lockean epistemological terminology, Addison pursues his
general strategy of bringing philosophy out of the libraries to the
coffee-houses by explaining, clarifying, and demystifying it. And
Ronald Paulson has recently claimed that Addison "drew uncritically
on the sensationalist psychology of Hobbes as well as on Locke," and
that he derived his idea of imagination from Locke's distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. This view of Addison's
mastery of the Essay has, as we will see, occasionally been troubled by
observations of how Addison departs from Locke, but the basic
understanding of Addison's mastery of Locke as a mode of benign
adoption, explanation, or expression predominates.^ It fails in two
^ See Michael Ketcham, Transparent Designs: Reading Performance, and Form in the Spectator
Papers (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985) 23; Brian McCrea, Addison and Steele are
Dead: The English Department, Its Canon, and the Professionalization of Literary Criticism
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990) 25; Ronald Paulson, The Beautiful, Novel, and
Strange: Aesthetics and Heterodoxy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 55,
68. For other assertions of Addison's adoption and expression of Locke,see Samuel Holt Monk,
The Sublime:a Studyof Critical Theories in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: MLA, 1935)
57; Clarence D. Thorpe, "Addison's Contribution to Criticism," in The Seventeenth Century:
Studies in the History ofEnglish Thought and Literature from Bacon to Pope (Stanford; Stanford
University Press, 1951) 316-29; William Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism;a
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•ways. First, it does not recognize the specific -ways, beyond the explicit
and, as -we •will see, somewhat misleading references to primary and
secondary qualities, wit, and judgment, in which the Essay is embedded
in Addison's writing. Second, and more important, it overlooks
important differences between what Locke says in this work about
perception, truth, pleasure, delusion, art, passion, and language, and
what Addison says about them. By comparing Addison's essays on the
pleasures of the imagination with not only those passages from the
Essay which he explicitly invokes, but also some passages from this
work to which he appears to be responding but does not cite and some
passages of which he shows no awareness at all, we may address these
failures and arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of his
project in these essays and their relationship to Locke's empiricism.
*
The presence of Locke's Essay in the essays on the pleasures of the
imagination is palpable right from the start:
Our Sight is the most perfect and most delightful of all our
Senses. It fills the Mind with the largest Variety of Ideas
converses with its Objects at the greatest Distance, and
continues the longest in Action without being tired or
satiated with its proper Enjoyments. The Sense of Feeling
can indeed give us a Notion of Extention, Shape, and all
other Ideas that enter at the Eye, except Colours; but at the
same time it is very much streigtned and confined in its
Operations, to the number, bulk, and distance of its particu-

Short History (New York; Alfred Knopf, 1959) 252-61; Ernest Tuveson, The Imagination as a
Means ofGrace:Locke andthe Aesthetics ofRomanticism (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress,
1960) 97; Jerome Stolnitz, "Locke and the Categories of •Value in Eighteenth-Century British
Aesthetic Theory," Philosophy, 38 (1963): 48; Lee Andrew Elioseff, The Cultural Milieu of
Addison's Literary Criticism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963) 152, 154, 164; Martin
Kallich, The Association of Ideasand Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century England (The Hague:
Mouton, 1970) 45-51, 70-71; 'William H. Youngren, "Addison and the Binh of EighteenthCentury Aesthetics," Modem Philology, 79 (1982): 267-83; Charles Knight, "The Spectator's
Generalizing Discourse," in Telling People What to Think: Early Eighteenth-Century Periodicals
from "The Review" to "TheRambler," ed. T. A. Downie and Thomas N. Corns (London: Frank
Cass) 51.
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lar Objects. Our Sight seems designed to supply all these
Defects, and may be considered as a more delicate and
diffusive kind of Touch, that spreads it self over an infinite
Multitude of Bodies, comprehends the largest Figures, and
brings into our reach some of the most remote Parts of the
Universe. (3: 535-36)

Understanding sight and touch as senses which have objects and which
furnish us with ideas, and understanding sight as a form of tactile
sensation, Addison here aligns himself with the general corpuscularian
theory of sensation which is asserted, though not without some major
difficulties, over the course of Locke's Essay? And in observing that
the tactile sense can give us some though not all of the ideas sight does,
Addison restates an observation which occupies Locke to a signficant
extent early in Book II of this work; "we can receive and convey into
our Minds the Ideas of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest of
Bodies, both by seeing and feeling."^ The accoimt of the sense of sight
as something that converses with its objects may also remind Locke's
readers of another of his preferred locutions evident in the following
claim from the conclusion of Book I: "Men then come to be furnished
with fewer or more simple Ideas from without, according as the Objects,
they converse with, afford greater or less variety" (107). The concep
tion of the mind as a space which ideas enter is one of the central
conceptions of mind in the Essay, and we may recognize extension,
shape, number, and bulk as not just qualities listed by Aristotle in his
account of the objects common to all senses, but also some of the
primary qualities of objects of which our senses, according to Locke,
give us simple ideas. Finally, the panegyric on sight may recall not just
Cicero but also Locke who, perhaps following Cicero as he often does,
describes sight as "the most comprehensive of all our Senses" (146), and
asserts that the Perception of the Mind, [is] most aptly explained by
Words relating to the Sight" (363).'

' For a good account of Locke's corpuscularianism, see Peter Alexander, Ideas, Qualities and
Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,
1985).
' John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975) 127. All further references are to this edition.
^ For Locke's spatial metaphor of mind, see William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism, and
Philosophy (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1994), 31-54. The Aristotle passageis from
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Addison continues to think and write in a Lockean mode in the
rest of this first essay on the pleasures of the imagination. In claiming
that "we cannot indeed have a single Image in the Fancy that did not
make its first Entrance through the Sight" (3: 537), Addison not only
sustains the spatial metaphor, but also restates Locke's point that the
mind in general and the imagination in particular cannot invent new
ideas but only work with ones they receive through sensation and
reflection (119, 120). And readers of the Essay would find it difficult
to read Addison's claim that "we have the Power of retaining, altering,
and compounding those Images, which we have once received" (3: 537)
without thinking of Book II of the Essay where, after describing simple
ideas, Locke describes various mental faculties and the mental acts of
retaining, comparing, altering, combining, and enlarging. When
Addison then observes that "there are few Words in the English
Langugage which are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed
Sense than those of the Fancy and the Imagination" (3: 537), he is
making the kind of complaint which runs through all of Locke's
writing but which is especially pointed in Book III of the Essay. In
order to avoid the censure of the epistemologist, Addison does what
Eustace Budgell does in Spectator #373 after he cites Locke's complaint
in Book HI about the abuse of words— ddison follows one of Locke's
"Remedies of the Imperfection and Abuse of Words" (509) by defining his
terms. He explains what he "means" by "pleasures of the imagination"
and then fixes and determines the meaning of his key terms, "imagina
tion" and "fancy." When he goes on to claim that "colours paint
themselves on the Fancy," and that "we are struck" by the symmetry
of any thing we see (3: 538), Addison momentarily drops spatial
metaphors of mind for a figurative discourse of mind which was
established by the classical rhetoricians and which was also made
available to him by, among many others, Locke, who wonders how the
mind "comes...by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy
of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety," observes that
"every thing does not hit alike upon every man's Imagination" (8), refers
to "the entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on

On the Soul,tr3.ns\. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin, 1986),172. The Ciceropassage
is from 2: 87;357 of On the Orator,transl. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (London: Heinemann,
1942) 469.
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the Fancy" (156), and discusses how men are imposed upon by
"Rhetorical Discourses," their "Phancies being struck with some lively
metaphorical Representations" (676).^ Addison then uses Lockean
terminology to categorize the different kinds of imaginative pleasure he
wishes to discuss, and concludes by opposing the pleasures of the
imagination which appear at first sight and require no "Labour or
Difficulty," with those of the understanding which are "worked out by
Dint of Thinking, and attended with too violent a Labour of the Brain"
(3: 539). At least for readers of Locke, Addison here appears to be
restating a passage in the Essay immediately following the account of
wit and judgment which he cites in his earlier essays on wit: "its [wit's]
Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought,
to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind without
looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the Picture
and the gayety of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about
to examine it, by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason" (157).
Given these specific and unacknowledged ways in which Locke's
Essay is written into the first essay on the pleasures, it may seem more
appropriate to speak of Locke's mastery of Addison rather than
Addison's mastery of Locke. But this would be to overlook the severe
revision of the Essay which is underway in this essay, a revision which
is signalled in the first sentence where, adapting a sentence from the
Essay, Addison swerves away from the concern with knowledge,
insight, and accuracy of perception which are connoted by Locke's
term, "comprehensive," towards the concern with perfection and
pleasure. This revision is more evident in the set of linguistic substitu
tions Addison so casually manages in this essay. Whereas Locke
commonly claims in the Essay that the sense of sight furnishes the mind
or understanding with ideas, Addison is claiming that it furnishes the
imagination with ideas. Whereas Locke typically asserts the empiricist
axiom by saying that we cannot have a single idea in the mind or
understanding which did not first enter by the senses, Addison asserts
that we cannot have a single image in the fancy that did not so enter.
' For striking metaphors of mind in classical treatments of rhetoric, see, for example, Plato,
"Symposium," transl. MichaelJoyce, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1961),550; Aristotle, Rhetoric,transl.
Lane Cooper (1932; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 185; Longinus, On the Sublime,
transl. T. S. Dorsch (New York: Penguin, 1965), 127.
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Whereas Locke claims that the mind has the power to retain, alter, and
compound its ideas into complex ideas (ideas of substances, modes, and
relations), Addison is claiming that we have the power to retain, alter,
and compound images in the imagination into "all the varieties of
Picture and Vision that are most agreeable to the Imagination" (3: 537).
Finally, whereas Locke claims that the qualities of bodies are primary
or secondary, Addison claims that the pleasures of the imagination are.
At the same time that Addison proceeds on the premises of
Lockean epistemology, then, he is also diverging from Lockean
linguistic usage. More specifically, he uses the terminology Locke uses
to describe the mind, its operations, its contents, and the bodies that
affect the organs of sensation, to describe the imagination, its opera
tions, its products, and its pleasures. It may be thought that given that
Addison is mainly concerned with the imagination and art and that
Locke is not, it is hardly surprising and not really significant that he
uses empiricist vocabulary to talk about them. But the point here is
that Addison uses terms which Locke typically uses to talk about one
thing—the mind—to talk about only part of that thing—the imagina
tion. And this amounts to one of those "verbal maneuvers" which
Rorty imderstands to mark important differences between ways of
thinking about the mind, and therefore perception, truth, and
knowledge, in western philosophical tradition.'' Its immediate
consequence is that the faculty of imagination assumes an importance
which Locke would find very hard to accept, for this faculty is now
directly involved in at least certain kinds of sensory perception.
Though Locke describes the imagination altering ideas which exist in
the mind, the above quotations indicate that the only things he
describes with any consistency in his epistemological writing as directly
entering, striking, and painting upon the imagination are rhetorical
discourses, metaphors, tropes, allusions, and wit. But Addison
describes visible objects and their ideas as coming through the senses
and directly impinging upon and furnishing the imagination—"it is this
Sense which furnishes the Imagination with its Ideas." This sets the
precedent for the following essays in which visible objects just as much
as poems "affect" and "address themselves" to the imagination. If it is

'See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror Nature (Princeton; Princeton University Press,
1979), 58.

52

1650-1850

too strong to say that for Addison, seeing is imagining, it must at least
be said that his divergence from, if not direct revision of, Lockean usage
involves the imagination in seeing in a way that violates Locke's way
of thinking about sensory perception and that, as Elioseff observes,
aligns him with Hobbes's definition of sense as original fancy.® This of
course means that Addison also ends up talking about all visible objects
in the way that Locke prefers to talk about poetry and rhetoric, for in
the Essay, it is only wit, metaphor, allusion, tropes, and figures which
are described as directly striking, entering, and painting upon the
imagination. If by "aesthetic object" one meant that which directly
strikes or enters the imagination, then only poetry and rhetoric would
be aesthetic objects in the world described by Locke, whereas, in
Addison's world, poetry, rhetoric, all visible objects, and all remem
bered visible objects would be. By talking about the imagination in the
way Locke talks about the mind, Addison thus does two important
things: he implicates the imagination in sensory perception, and treats
the entire visible world and all language that describes it in the way that
Locke treats the language of poetry and persuasion. While Locke's
epistemological discourse is being narrowed down into a discourse
about the imagination, then, the object of this faculty is expanding to
include all visible objects.
Instances of this inconspicuous but vital difference between
Addisonion and Lockean usage occur throughout the rest of the series.
While Addison sometimes follows Locke in saying that the mind
receives with ideas from seeing, he frequently claims that it is the
imagination or fancy that does so (3: 540, 545, 546, 547, 562, 577). As
if imagination is directly involved in seeing objects, as if one needs
imagination in order to see well and properly and to retain ideas of
what one sees, Addison goes so far as to claim that a poet needs a strong
and vigorous imagination "so as to be able to receive lively Ideas from
outward Objects" (3: 563), and that the fancy of a good critic "must be
warm, to retain the Print of those Images it hath received from outward
objects" (3:561). Ifwe read this last passage remembering Locke'sclaim
that "if the Organs, or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-hardned
with cold, will not receive the Impression of the Seal, from the usual
impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a temper too soft, will not

'Elioseff, Cultural Milieu, 175.
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hold it well, when well imprinted...the print left by the Seal, will be
obscure" (363-64), we see that imagination is here taking the place not
of the mind but of the organs of perception themselves. And as this last
quotation from Addison also indicates, he continues to talk about the
visible world in the way Locke and the classical rhetoricians prefer to
talk about persuasion and literature, for he continues to use "image"
where Locke would use "idea" (though Locke occasionally refers to the
"image" the mind receives through sensation): Addison refers to the
"Images" the mind will receive from Matter in the afterlife (3: 547); the
"infinite variety of Images" with which the Sight is fed when beholding
the "wide Fields of Nature" (3: 549); "the Images, which flow from the
Objects themselves [which] appear weak and faint, in Comparison of
those that come from the Expressions" poets use to describe them (3:
560-61)Since the visible world can supply not just ideas but images
to the mind, it makes sense for Addison also to continue talking about
it as if it were a work of art that strikes not the senses but the imagina
tion: the "Beauty of a Plantation...strikes the Imagination at first Sight"
(3: 552); the "Fancy is infinitely more struck with the view of the open
Air" (3: 557); "in the Survey of any Object we have only so much of it
painted on the Imagination, as comes in at the Eye" (417). And those
actions which Locke almost always ascribes to the mind are again
ascribed by Addison to the imagination when he writes that "it is in the
Power of the Imagination, when it is once Stocked with particular
Ideas, to enlarge, compound, and vary them at her own Pleasure" (3:
558-59). The inflections of Lockean usage evident in the first of the
essays on the pleasures of the imagination, then, persist throughout the
series, and reveal that in an inconspicuous but important respect,
Addison's epistemology is different from Locke's.
Addison's departures from the Essay take several other forms
besides inflections of linguistic usage. Consider, for example, his
treatment of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
in Spectator #413. Having observed in the prior essay that we derive
pleasure from the sight of things that are great, uncommon, or

' For classical and English Renaissance discussions of imagery as a function of tropes and figures,
see Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hohhes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 181-8. For a recognition and interpretation of the instability of the
difference between Art and Nature in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination, see.Neil
Saccamano, "The Subhme Force of Words in Addison's 'Pleasures,'" ELH5& (1991): 83-106.
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beautiful, Addison in this essay explains why God has arranged things
in this way. After claiming that God annexed pleasure to our sight of
the great in order to move us to contemplate him, that he annexed
pleasure to the sight of the uncommon to encourage us in the pursuit
of knowledge, and that he annexed pleasure to the sight of the beautiful
in our own species so that we might be tempted to multiply our kind,
Addison explains why God "made every thing that is beautiful in all
other Objects pleasant":
Things would make but a poor Appearance to the Eye, if we
saw them only in their proper Figures and Motions: And
what Reason can we assign for their exciting in us many of
those Ideas which are different from any thing that exists in
the Objects themselves, (for such are Light and Colours) were
it not to add Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe, and
make it more agreeable to the Imagination? We are every
where entertained with pleasing Shows and Apparitions, we
discover imaginary Glories in the Heavens, and in the Earth,
and see some of this visionary Beauty poured out upon the
whole Creation; but what a rough unsightly Sketch of nature
should we be entertained with, did all her Colouring disap
pear, and the several Distinctions of Light and Shade vanish?
In short, our Souls are at present delightfully lost and
bewildered in a pleasing Delusion, and we walk about like the
Enchanted Hero of a Romance, who sees beautiful Castles,
Woods and Meadows; and at the same time hears the war
bling of Birds, and the purling of Streams; but upon the
finishing of some secret Spell, the fantastick Scene breaks up,
and the disconsolate Knight finds himself on a barren Heath,
or in a solitary Desart." (3: 546-7)
It is at this point that Addison divulges his supposition that his readers
are acquainted with "that great Modern Discovery," which is "that
Light and Colours, as apprehended by the Imagination, are only Ideas
in the Mind, and not Qualities that have any Existence in Matter" and
which is explained in "the Eighth Chapter of the Second Book of Mr.
Lock's Essay on Human Understanding" (3: 547).
In the chapter to which Addison refers us,''Somefarther Consider
ations concerning our simple Ideas," Locke does indeed discuss the color
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of objects as one of their secondary qualities "which, whatever reality
we, by mistake, attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects
themselves, but Powers to produce variousSensations in us, and depend
on those primary Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of
parts" (137). As a paraphrase of this account of the color of objects,
Addison's statement is thus fair enough. And Addison's reference to
being deluded by color is not entirely at odds with the Lockean account
in this chapter, for Locke certainly grants that we commonly make the
"mistake" of imputing or attributing secondary qualities such as color
to objects, of believing that our ideas of secondary qualities resemble
something that really exists in objects, and of believing that secondary
qualities really exist in objects as primary qualities do. And, as in many
of the treatments of particular ideas and kinds of ideas from Locke
through Hume, the chapter concludes with an account of why we
make this mistake, a genealogy of error. But when Locke returns to
the matter in the final chapters of Book II, we find that our
epistemological predicament is not quite so desperate as that of a
bewildered and deluded hero of romance.
On the contrary, ideas of secondary qualities such as color are
both real and adequate. As Locke puts it in the chapter, "Of Real and
Fantastical Ideas,"
those Ideas of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain, etc. being in us
the Effects of Powers in things without us, ordained by our
Maker, to produce in us such Sensations; they are real Ideas
in us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities, that are really in
things themselves. For these several Appearances, being
designed to be the Marks, whereby we are to know, and
distinguish Things, which we have to do with; our Ideas do
as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing
Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else
exact Resemblances of something in the things themselves:
the reality lying in that steady correspondence, they have
with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings. (372-3)
And as he puts it in the next chapter, "Of Adequate and Inadequate
Ideas,"
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First, That all our simple Ideas are adequate. Because being
nothing but the effects of certain powers in Things, fitted and
ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they
cannot but be correspondent, and adequate to those Powers:
And we are sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if
sugar produce in us the Ideas, which we call Whiteness, and
Sweetness, we are sure there is a power in Sugar to produce
those Ideas in our Minds, or else they could not have been
produced by it. And so each Sensation answering the Power,
that operates on any of our Senses, the Idea so produced, is a
real Idea, (and not a fiction of the Mind, which has no power
to produce any simple Idea{) and cannot but be adequate,
since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple
Ideas are adequate. (375)

One might well argue that Locke's assertion of the reality and adequacy
of ideas of secondary qualities such as color is at odds in an important
way with his initial account of secondary qualities in chapter 8 as
qualities which are not really in things and qualities our ideas of which
do not resemble anything really in objects. But this would not change
the fact that Addison ignores Locke's account of how our ideas of
secondary qualities such as color help us to "know, and distinguish
Things." The fact that we may mistakenly attribute secondary qualities
such as color to objects does not for Locke mean they simply delude us.
By neglecting this part of Locke's account of our ideas of color,
Addison simplifies his master's statement and places us in an
epistemological situation much more limited than that assigned to us,
at least in some passages, by Locke.
But even given the way in which Locke concedes that color
deludes us, Addison's response to this fact is fundamentally at odds
with the spirit of the Essay, for though Locke emphasizes the limita
tions of our knowledge, he hardly celebrates the state of being deluded,
bewildered, and lost. That Addison does is evident not only in this
Observing that Addison's Lockean account of our perception of colors has an exact
counterpart in Cudworth's Treatise Concerning Eternaland ImmutableMorality, Oskar Kenshur
points out that this account does not necessarily make Addison an empiricist as opposed to a
rationalist. See "'The Tumour of Their Own Hearts'; Relativism, Aesthetics, and the Rhetoric
of Demystification," in Aesthetics and Ideology, ed. George Levine (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1994), 58-61.
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passage but also in Spectator # 412 when he claims that "a spacious
Horison is an Image of Liberty, where the eye has Room to range
abroad to expatiate at large on the Immensity of its Views and to lose
it self amidst the Variety of Objects that offer themselves to its
Observation" (3; 541), and later in Spectator # 420 when he celebrates
being "lost in such a Labyrinth of Suns and Worlds, and confounded
with the Immensity and Magnificence of Nature" (3:575). And, as we
will see, Addison does not care to see through the "Delusions" of fairy
writing but willingly gives himself up "to so agreeable an Imposture"
(3: 571-2). The reason that Addison affirms states of delusion, be
wilderment, and enchantment is, of course, that they give him pleasure.
However much he may wish to avoid being lost in confusion and
obscurity when he sits down to write about Milton, he still enjoys
being lost in the world. When it comes to the secondary quality of
color, Addison is thus one of those men with whom Locke, in his
famous condemnation of rhetoric, finds fault, but also one of those men
with whom he knows it is "vain to find fault," for he is one of those
men who "love...to be deceived" (508).
The intriguing way in which Addison responds to Lockean
epistemological writing and thought is again apparent in Spectator 4416
where he turns to the secondary pleasures of the imagination, those
which arise "from Objects...that once entered in at our Eyes, and are
afterwards called up into the Mind, either barely by its own Opera
tions, or on occasion of something without us, as Statues or Descrip
tions" (3: 558). Haying briefly discussed the issue of how ideas from
different senses are related to each other in the opening essay and, in
the second essay, transformed it into one about how "Ideas of both
Senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together than when
they enter the Mind separately" (3: 544), Addison returns to it for a
third time:
To make use of a common Instance, let one who is born
Blind take an Image in his Hands, and trace out with his
Fingers the different Furrows and Impressions of the Chissel,
and he will easily conceive how the Shape of a Man, or Beast,
may be represented by it; but should he draw his Hand over
a Picture, where all is smooth and uniform, he would never
be able to imagine how the several prominencies and Depres-
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sions of a Human Body could be shewn on a plain Piece of
Canvas, that has in it no Unevenness or Irregularity (3:559).

In eighteenth-century epistemology and aesthetics, the case of the bhnd
man is indeed a "common Instance," one that was made common, in
part, by Locke's well-known response, included in the second and
following editions of the Essay, to a problem which was sent to him by
"the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molyneux" (145). Molyneux and Locke
ask us to consider "a Man horn blind, and now adult, and taught by his
touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and
nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which
is the Cube, which the Sphere." The question is "whether by his sight,
before he touch'd them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the
Globe, which the Cube," and the answer, according to both Molyneux
and Locke, is no, for he has not yet had the experience which would
teach him "that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so"
(146). With this passage, and Locke's general treatment of ideas of
different senses, in mind, it is difficult not to feel that Addison is again
writing out of his "mastery" of the Essay. But as usual, his mastery
introduces a few crucial changes, for whereas Locke has the blind man
handling and trying to identify the cubes and spheres which fascinate
the geometricians and epistemologists, Addison has him groping works
of art and trying to determine what they represent. The case of the
blind man is thus transformed from a strictly epistemological lesson
into a lesson on aesthetic appreciation.
This discussion of what the blind man can know and do introduces
Addison's observation, deriving from Aristotle, that in the case of
painting, statuary, music, and description, the pleasure of the imagina
tion proceeds from the act of the mind comparing the ideas arising
from the original objects with the ideas arising from the works of art
which represent them." He then goes on to claim.
It is this that makes the several kinds of Wit pleasant, which
consists, as I have formerly shown, in the Affinity of Ideas:
And we may add, it is this also that raises the little Satisfac
tion we sometimes find in the different sorts of false Wit;
" For Aristotle on the pleasure of perceiving imitations, see Poetics, transl. T. S. Dorsch (New
York; Penguin, 1965), 35.
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whether it consist in the Affinity of Letters, as in Anagram,
Acrostick; or of syllables, as in doggerel Rhimes, Ecchos; or
of Words, as in Puns, Quibbles; or of a whole Sentence or
Poem, to Wings, and Altars. The final Cause, probably, of
annexing Pleasure to this Operation of the Mind, was to
quicken and encourage us in our Searches after Truth, since
the distinguishing one thing from another, and the right
discerning betwixt our Ideas, depends wholly upon our
comparing them together, and observing the Congruity or
Disagreement that appears among the several Works of
Nature. (3; 560)
Addison showed that true wit consists in the affinity of ideas in
Spectator #62, one of five essays on wit he published two months after
starting the periodical. This essay begins with a citation of Locke's
account of the difference between wit and judgment which becomes a
purple passage of eighteenth-century aesthetics, in part perhaps because
Addison publicly revered it as "the best and most philosophical
Account that I have ever met with of Wit, which generally, tho' not
always, consists in such a Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas as this
Author mentions" (1: 264). But as several commentators on the essays
on wit have observed, the qualifiers, "generally, tho' not always" are
certainly in order.For Addison fails to cite the conclusion of the
passage from the Essay where Locke overtly condemns what Addison
calls true wit as something that "is not perfectly conformable to" the
"severe rules of Truth, and Reason" (157). Nor does Addison observe
that the tropes and figures which are grounded in the congruity of ideas
and which for Addison constitute true wit are condemned on
epistemological grounds by Locke in both this passage and the famous
passage on the abuse of words in Book III. Moreover, Addison has
already, in the previous essays on the history of false wit, inverted
Locke's pairings of knowledge with industry and wit with immediate
gratification by emphasizing the labor and industry of those who

" See David A. Hansen, "Addison on Ornament and Poetic Style," Studies in Criticism and
Aesethtics, 1660-1800, ed. Howard Anderson and John Shea (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press,1967), 94-127; Robert Montgomery,"Addison and the 'Helps and Ornaments
of Art,'" Criticism, 25 (1983): 331-2; John Sitter, Arguments of Augustan Wit (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 62-4.
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produce works of false wit. He goes on in Spectator #62 to challenge
Locke's understanding of the relation between wit and truth when he
approvingly cites Bouhours and Boileau who, Addison claims, assert
that "the Basis of all Wit is Truth" (1: 268). And as if everything he
says is in perfect conformity with Lockean epistemology, Addison
concludes the essay by casually introducing an alteration which in fact
flagrantly violates Locke's account of the grounds of wit and knowl
edge; "I must not dismiss this Subject without observing, that as Mr.
Lock in the passage above-mentioned has discovered the most fruitful
Source of Wit, so there is another of a quite contrary Nature to it,
which does likewise branch it self out into several Kinds. For not only
the Resemblance but the Opposition of Ideas does very often produce
Wit" (1: 269-70). Acting on the authority of Locke, Addison not only
affirms what Locke denies and fails to acknowledge Locke's denial, but
also violates the account of the distinction between the faculties of wit
and judgment and their objects which Locke attempts to assert in the
very passage from the Essay Addison cites.
It is this kind of vigorous reworking of Locke which recurs in the
opening essay on the secondary pleasures. For here again, Addison
affirms wit on both epistemological and hedonistic grounds, though the
epistemological sanction here takes a slightly different form. Remark
ably, the pleasure we derive from wit, including false wit, is the same
in an essential way as the pleasure we derive from seeing anything new
or uncommon which Addison described in the earlier essay, for both
serve knowledge: just as God has "annexed a secret Pleasure to the Idea
of any thing that is new or uncommon, that he might encourage us in
the Pursuit after Knowledge" (3:545), so he has annexed pleasure to the
mental act of comparison, which we perform in the face of wit and
works of art, in order to encourage us in our search for truth. Works
of both false and true wit, when we perceive them, cause us to compare
ideas; by comparing ideas, we observe the congruity and disagreement
between them; by observing the congruity and disagreement between
them, we discover truth. By making the act of comparison pleasurable,
Addison claims, God thus encourages us to discover truth. And rather
than asserting as Locke does in the passage on wit that it is by means of
the faculty of judgment that we perceive the disagreement between our
ideas and the faculty of wit that we perceive the congruity between
them, Addison speaks as if the mental act of comparing which allows
us to see both the agreement and disagreement of ideas is a single
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mental action performed by or by means of a single faculty. But since
elsewhere in the Essay Locke himself claims that a single fac
ulty—reason—perceives both the agreement and disagreement of ideas,"
Addison is also conforming with a Lockean statement. In his treatment
of wit in the essays on the pleasures of the imagination, then, Addison
adopts the Lockean way of ideas presented in Book II of the Essay and
aligns himself with some of Locke's claims, but at the same time
challenges, without saying so, Locke's epistemological critique of wit
and some of the most categorical assertions of the faculty psychology
in which this critique is grounded.
As Addison proceeds with his consideration of the secondary
pleasures, he continues to engage with linguistic issues, in part because
he confines himself to the pleasures "which proceed from ideas raised
by Words, because most of the Observations that agree with Descrip
tions, are equally Applicable to Painting and Statuary" (3: 560). Given
that Addison both follows and reworks Locke's views on sensation,
ideas from different senses, imagination, primary and secondary
qualities, and wit, his relationship with Lockean linguistic theory is not
surprising. On the one hand, he adopts several of its tenets. Like
Locke, Addison understands ideas to be not just the products of
sensation and reflection and the objects of faculties such as imagination
and judgment, but also the meanings of words. For both Locke and
Addison, ideas are in the minds of those who use words and are "raised"
and "excited" in the minds of those who hear and read them. And like
Locke, Addison has dismissed seventeenth-century Adamic linguistic
theory in favor of an understanding of words which come to be used
by men "as the Signs of their Ideas-, not by any natural connexion, that
there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then
there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary
Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such
an Idea " (403). And, as we have seen, Addison addresses himself to a
situation, lamented by Locke to no end, which is made possible by the
fact that the meanings of words are established by human acts of
imposition: different speakers may annex different ideas to the same
words and thereby obstruct the communication of ideas. He returns

" See Esiay, 669. Sitter also notes the difficulties Locke has in maintaining his -wit/judgment
iiStinct\an,m Arguments of Augustan Wit 51-70.
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to his concern with this situation when, in Spectator 0416, he identifies
"the different Ideas that several Readers affix to the same Words" as part
of the reason different people have "a different Relish of the same
Descriptions" (3: 561). In stating the problem in this way, Addison is
perhaps thinking of the "Epistle to the Reader" where Locke asserts
that the same truth will not be "equally relished by every one in the same
dress," and that "Men's Principles, Notions, and Relishes are so different,
that it is hard to find a Book which pleases or displeases all Men" (8-9). It
is in order to overcome this problem that, as we have also seen,
Addison follows Locke's recommendation to establish clearly the
meaning of the key terms in his discourse. Moreover, just as Locke
commonly ascribes force to language and implicitly elaborates a version
of the classical rhetorical doctrine of energeia, so Addison claims that
"words, when well chosen, have so great a Force in them, that a
Description often gives us more lively Ideas than the sight of Things
themselves." Finally, as Locke commonly understands the language of
the poets to strike and be painted on the fancy and the imagination, so
Addison continues to describe them throughout the final essays on the
secondary pleasures."
But while Addison proceeds in accordance with some premises of
Lockean philosophy of language, he quietly departs from several of
Locke's other pronouncements on the subject. This is most obvious
when it comes to the proper function of language. Over the course of
Book III, Locke emphasizes that the proper function of language is the
communication of ideas: "the true end of Speech," Locke writes in a
typical statement on the issue, is "to be the easiest and shortest way of
communicating our Notions" (460; see also 405, 409, 478, 497, 510,
504). It is obviously with considerable difficulty and regret that Locke,
in the opening of his condemnation of rhetoric, brings himself to
recognize another function of language: "since Wit and Fancy finds
easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and real Knowledge,
figurative Speeches, and allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted,
as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we

" For an account of Locke's rejeaion of seventeenth-century Adamiclanguage theory,see Hans
Aarsleff, "Leibniz on Locke on Language," in his From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of
Language and Intellectual History (Minneapolis:University of MinnestoaPress, 1982),42-83. For
Locke's account of the power of words to give us ideas as the world itself does, see Essay, 407,
410, 503.
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seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than Information and Improvement,
such Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for Faults"
(508). Locke here grudgingly concedes that one function of language
is to provide pleasure and delight and that, since the tropes and figures
allow it to fulfill this function, they must be permitted in discourses
which we read in pursuit of pleasure. While Locke recognizes the
hedonistic function of language and even grants it legitimacy in some
forms of discourse, then, his commitment to speaking of things as they
are and doing his duty prevents him from affirming it in the manner of
Addison.
Besides differing from Locke on the issue of the proper function
of language, Addison also introduces fundamental alterations to Locke's
prevailing view of how different faculties are related to different forms
of discourse. This is clear in the opening essay on the secondary
pleasures where Addison presents his account of what one needs to
judge well of the quality of literature:
For, to have a true Relish, and form a right Judgment of a
Description, a Man should be born with a good Imagination,
and must have well weighed the Force and Energy that lie in
the several Words of a Language, so as to be able to distin
guish which, are most significant and expressive of their
proper Ideas, and what additional Strength and Beauty they
are capable of receiving from Conjunction with others. The
Fancy must be warm, to retain the Print of those Images it
hath received from outward objects; and the Judgment
discerning, to know what Expressions are most proper to
cloath and adorn them to the best Advantage. A man who is
deficient in either of these Respects, tho' he may receive the
general Notion of a Description, can never see distinctly all
its particular Beauties: As a Person, with a weak Sight, may
have the confused Prospect of a Place that lies before him,
without entering into its several Parts, or discerning the
variety of its Colours in their full Glory and Perfection. (3:
561)
It is easy to overlook the fact that simply by treating a poetic descrip
tion as an object of judgment, something that may be properly or
improperly judged of, Addison departs from Locke's prevailing
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conception of poetry as something that, while misleading the judgment,
is the direct object of palates, relishes, fancy, and imagination. In the
Essay, when the faculty of judgment is not being misled by works of art
and oratory, it is not determining their merit or quality but stripping
them of precisely what makes them such works—tropes and figures—in
order to determine the truth or falsity of the ideas and propositions
they express. In claiming that a man's faculty of judgment must be
discerning in order for him to determine which tropes and figures
would make the expression of particular ideas the most beautiful and
pleasing to the imagination, Addison also defies Locke's explicit
(though, again, not consistent) identifications of the tropes and figures
as the work of wit, fancy, and imagination. And in claiming that a man
needs a good imagination to weigh the force of words and to distinguish
which are the most expressive of their proper ideas, Addison violates
Locke's strenuous attempt in the Essay to make these activities the
business of judgment, reason, and understanding.
This crucial departure from Locke is confirmed by Addison's
opening remarks on the disagreeable. Explaining that we derive
pleasure from a description of something "that is Disagreeable when
look'd upon" by virtue of "the Action of the Mind, which compares xh.e
Ideas that arise from Words, with the ideas that arise from the Objects
themselves," Addison offhandedly remarks, "perhaps, this may be more
properly called the Pleasure of the Understanding than of the Fancy,
because we are not so much delighted with the Image that is contained
in the Description, as with the Aptness of the Description to excite the
Image" (3:566-67). Since Addison earlier establishes that the mental act
of comparison is the basis for all secondary pleasures of the imagina
tion, not just those derived from descriptions of the disagreeable, his
speculation here that the pleasures of this act are really pleasures of the
understanding is startling—if this is true, all of the pleasures that
Addison has been calling "pleasures of the imagination" are really
pleasures of the understanding. But then the pleasure we derive from
texts which ostensibly address reason, judgment, and the understanding
are pleasures of the imagination. For, in Spectator #420, it turns out
that the authors of nonfiction, "all who describe visible Objects of a
real Existence," appeal to the imagination: the historian is "qualified to
please the Imagination" because he has both "Art" and "Veracity," and
"there are none who more gratifie and enlarge the Imagination," than
the natural scientists, for "there is something very engaging to the
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Fancy, as well as to our Reason, in the Treatises of Metals, Minerals,
Plants and Meteors" (3: 574-75). (This does not change the fact,
however, that the imagination cannot "keep pace" with Reason.) In
these passages, as in his account of the requirements of the literary
critic, one of the things Addison is doing is disrupting the alignment of
imagination with poetry and reason/understanding/judgment with
historical and scientific writing which Locke attempts to sustain in the
Essay. But if, as Addison's usage throughout these essays implies, the
imagination is directly involved in the mind's perception of the visible
world, it is not surprising to find him claiming that all discourse that
describes this visible world, no matter how it describes it, also appeals
to and pleases the imagination.
Besides so radically but so inconspicuously diverging from Locke's
understanding of the function of language and the relationship between
different forms of discourse and different mental faculties, Addison also
diverges in some ways from Locke's understanding of the tropes and
figures as the essence of oratorical and poetic discourse. Given that in
the earlier papers on wit Addison understands the tropes and figures as
forms of true wit, it is rather surprising that they do not feature much
in his opening essay on the secondary pleasures. Rather than concen
trating on the rhetorical dimension of poetry, Addison is here more
concerned with its mimetic dimension and, like Aristotle, explains the
pleasures of poetry mainly in terms of it. When he proceeds to present
his account of energeia, he refers not to figurative speeches but simply
to "words." The power of words to give us more vivid, lively ideas
than our senses do derives simply from the fact that language can
describe features of a visible object which we do not observe either
because we are inattentive or because those features are not visible to
us at the place from which we view it (3: 561). Though in the next
essay he claims the poet must have a strong imagination in order to
range ideas together in "such Figures and Representations as are most
likely to hit the Fancy of the Reader" (3:563), Addison is more inclined
to observe not how language or particular forms of it strike the fancy
and the mind, but how various parts of the world itself do. This is
why, after the essays on fairy writing and the disagreeable, he presents
a summary of how poetry pleases the imagination in which he refers
not so much to its rhetorical dimension as to what it represents: "thus
we see how many ways Poetry addresses it self to the Imagination, as
it has not only the whole Circle of nature for its Province, but makes
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new Worlds of its own, shews us Persons who are not to be found in
Being, and represents even the Faculties of the Soul, with her several
Virtues and Vices, in a sensible Shape and Character" (3: 573). Even if
we recognize the final reference to the material representation of the
immaterial as a reference to tropes such as metaphor, personification,
and allegory, the emphasis here is not on the rhetorical dimension of
language but on that which the language of poetry describes or
imitates.
When Addison proceeds to consider how historical and scientific
writing please the imagination, the emphasis is again not on how the
historians and scientists represent, but on what they represent. It is
only in the final essay of the series that he directly addresses what for
Locke is the essence of oratory and poetry, but he does so, at least
initially, in connection with the kind of prose Locke himself writes.
The pleasures of the imagination are often to be met with in the
writing of "the Polite Masters of Morality, Criticism, and other
Speculations abstracted from Matter; who, though they do not directly
treat of the visible Parts of Nature, often draw from them their
Similitudes, Metaphors, and Allegories" (3:377). Addison then affirms
these tropes and figures on both hedonistic and epistemological
grounds:
By these Allusions a Truth in the Understanding is as it were
reflected by the Imagination; we are able to see something
like Colour and Shape in a Notion, and to discover a Scheme
of Thoughts traced out upon Matter. And here the Mind
receives a great deal of Satisfaction, and has two of its Facul
ties gratified at the same time, while the Fancy is busy in
copying after the Understanding, and transcribing Ideas out
of the Intellectual World into the Material. (3: 577)
In abstract nonfictional prose, the tropes and figures serve to express or
present truth, thought, and ideas, and they give pleasure to both the
imagination and the understanding. Addison elaborates on the
epistemological and pedagogical value of the tropes and figures in the
next paragraph where he recommends that writers of abstract prose use
"Allusions" drawn from the great or the beautiful in nature, but not the
uncommon, for "the chief Design of an Allusion being to illustrate and
explain the Passages of an Author, it should be always borrowed from
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what is more known and common, than the Passages which are to be
explained" (3: 578). And, finally, it turns out that these tropes and
figures are indeed at the heart of poetry, for though the talent of
affecting the imagination by means of allusions "setts off all Writings
in general," it is "the very Life and highest Perfection of Poetry" (3:
578). At the last minute in the series, the tropes and figures which
appeared to be fading from Addison's conception of poetry and its
pleasures thus emerge as the ground of poetic quality and pleasure as
well as at least part of the power of all other kinds of writing to please
and instruct.
Though he finally comes around to Locke's understanding of the
tropes and figures as the very life of poetry, Addison does not share
Locke's understanding of them as forms of expression which, though
misleading the judgment, strike and please the fancy and the imagina
tion, and which, "are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform
or instruct, wholly to be avoided" (508). But because Locke's position
on this matter is highly unstable, Addison's relation to him is not quite
as clear-cut as has been thought.^^ First of all, Addison might well have
cited the Essay itself as an example of how the tropes and figures can
serve truth and illustrate and explain a scheme of thoughts, for Locke's
epistemological discourse is pervasively figurative.'^ Secondly, in some
of his other writings, Locke explicitly affirms the use of tropes and
figures even in discourses "where truth and Knowledge are concerned."
In a passage from "Of the Conduct of the Understanding" which Locke
wrote in the late 1690s and intended to publish as a chapter of the Essay
but which only appeared as a separate piece in the collected works of
1706 (and so would have been available to Addison by the time he was
publishing, but not writing the first draft of, the essays on the plea
sures), Locke writes that similes "may be a good way and useful in the
explaining our thoughts to others," and that "figured and metaphorical
expressions do well to illustrate more abstruse and unfamiliar ideas

See Hansen,"Addison on Ornament," 124; Montgomery,"'Helps and Ornaments,'" 335. For
another way in which Addison may differ from Locke on language, see Stephen Land, From
Signs to Propositions: the Concept of Form in Eighteenth-Century Semantic Theory (London;
Longman, 1974), 21-30.
That Locke'sepistemological discourse is figurative is a central observation of the commentary
on the Essay from Leibniz on, though it is commonly cited to explain not how Locke expresses
true propositions, but how he made basic mistakes. For a summary and extension of this
tradition of commentary, see Walker, Locke, 31-127.
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which the mind is not yet thoroughly accustomed to; but then they
must be made use of to illustrate ideas that we already have, not to
paint to us those which we yet have not."'^ And as some of Locke's
eighteenth-century readers observed, the same affirmation occurs in the
Essay itself, though in an implicit form. This is most evident in a
passage from the opening chapter of Book III where Locke observes
how "words which are made use of to stand for Actions and notions
quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious
sensible Ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to
stand for Ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses" (403).
As Leibniz points out, Locke is here talking about tropes such as
metaphor, and he is understanding them not as perfect cheats but as
forms of expression by which men, at least when they were forming
their languages, "might make known to others any Operations they felt
in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senses,"
and make others "the more easily to conceive" the operations of their
minds.'^ Finally, though Locke's recommendation of reasoning by
analogy in Book IV may not amount to "a meticulous justification of
metaphorical usage,"" it at least sanctions that operation of the mind
Locke elsewhere calls "wit" and perhaps implies that the products of
this faculty are not entirely out of place in discourses concerned with
truth. In light of these features of Lockean epistemology, Addison's
remarks on the tropes and figures need to be recognized not just, as
they commonly have been, as contradictions of some of Locke's
categorical pronouncements, but also as developments of some other
passages and potentials in his epistemological statement.
*
Besides both following and departing from the positions Locke takes on
the more strictly epistemological issues in the Essay, Addison stands in
a complicated relationship to the ethical and religious concerns partly
" See John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding,ed. Thomas Fowler (1882; New York;
Lenox Hill, 1971), 73.
" Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais Sur L 'Entendement Humain (Paris: Flammarion,
1990), 215.
" Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," Journal ofthe History of Ideas 54
(1993): 15.
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in the service of which Locke presents these positions. We have seen
that Addison's attitude towards pleasure is different from Locke's, but
he still follows Locke in important ways on this issue. First of all,
Addison may well have derived his idea of beauty as that which
"consists either in the Gaiety or Variety of Colours, in the Symmetry
and Proportion of Parts, in the Arrangement and Disposition of Bodies,
or in a just mixture and Concurrence of all together" and which raises
delight in us from Locke's incidental remark in the chapter on complex
ideas in which he claims that "Beauty, consisting of a certain composi
tion of Colour and Figure, causing delight in the Beholder" (165), is a
complex idea made up of different simple ideas and is therefore a mixed
mode (see also 224). Addison's general notion of Cod having annexed
pleasure and pain to certain ideas.for particular reasons was also
available to him in the Essay, opening the chapter on simple ideas of
both sensation and reflection with the claim that "Delight, or Uneasi
ness, one or other of them join themselves to almost all our Ideas, both
of Sensation and Reflection," Locke goes on to explain that it has
"pleased our Wise Creator, to annex to several objects, and to the Ideas
which we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts, a
concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees,
that those Faculties which he had endowed us with, might not remain
wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us" (128-29). And Addison's more
specific observation that Cod annexed pleasure to the idea of the great
in order to "give our Souls a just Relish" of the contemplation of Cod,
nothing but whom "can be its last, adequate, and proper Flappiness,"
is a version of the following passage from the Essay which Addison had
already cited in Spectator #387:
Cod hath scattered up and down severaldegrees of Pleasure and
Pain, in all the things that environ and affect us; and blended
them together, in almost all that our Thoughts and Senses
have to do with; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction,
and want of complete happiness, in all the Enjoyments which
the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the
enjoyment of him, with whom there is fullness of joy, and at
whose right hand are pleasures for evermore. (130)
Nor must we think that Locke condemns all of the pleasures of this
life. On the contary, just as Addison sometimes presents the essays as
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a way of finding pleasure in idle hours, so Locke presents the entire
Essay as a source of pleasure for both himself and the reader in "The
Epistle to the Reader" (6). This pleasure is made possible by virtue of
the fact, recognized by Addison in the opening essay on the pleasures,
that we derive different pleasures from the exercise of different
faculties: Locke writes that as the understanding "is the most elevated
Faculty of the Soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more constant
Delight than any ofthe other. Its searchesafter Truth,are a sort of Hawking
and Hunting wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the Pleasure"
(6). And though Locke regrets the fact that so many make mistakes in
their judgments of what is pleasureable in the long run and what will
make them truly happy, he certainly does not lament the fact that
"every intelligent Being really seeks happiness, which consists in the
enjoyment of Pleasure" (274-75,635). This claim is in fact an axiom of
Locke's hedonistic ethics.^®
But at the same time that he abides by Locke's definition of
beauty, his general account of God's annexation of pleasure and pain to
ideas for particular reasons related to the state of mankind, his general
account of how we derive different pleasures from different faculties,
and even his general account of the human pursuit of pleasure, Addison
is also challenging Locke in a fundamental way on this issue. In the
account of God's annexation of pleasure to ideas, Locke is claiming that
all pleasures of this world are in some degree imperfect, in some degree
mixed with pain, and that it is this imperfection of the pleasures God
has annexed to our ideas that makes us seek happiness with him.
Addison, on the other hand, speaks as if the pleasures are unadulterated
and asserts that it is the sheer quality of the pleasure God has annexed
to our ideas of the great that makes us contemplate him. And that God
may have annexed pleasure to some ideas, such as those of beautiful
things, simply for the sake of worldly pleasure, simply "that he might
render the whole Creation more gay and delightful," simply for the
sake of our "Satisfaction and Complacency in this world," is a departure
from Locke's concern in this passage with work, preservation, and
God. It is also a departure from the Essay at large, in which Locke,

® See Sterling Power Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1962), 89-109;James Tully, "Governing Conduct: Locke on the Reform of
Thought and Condua," 'm An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 179-241.
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though occasionally affirming some pleasures of this world, such as
those of the understanding, condemns many others and firmly
subordinates them to the project of knowing and praising God and
acting in accordance with his will (in part so that our souls may be
happy and experience pleasure eternally in the afterlife). As he puts it
in the same chapter on the pleasures and pains God annexes to our
ideas, the consideration of the reasons God has annexed pleasure and
pain to our ideas "serving to give us due sentiments of the Wisdom and
Goodness of the Soveraign Disposer of all Things, may not be
unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries: The knowledge and
veneration of Him, being, the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the
proper business of all Understandings" (131).^'
Indeed, given Locke's general subordination of all of the pleasures
of this world to our concern to know and obey God for the sake of the
salvation and pleasure of our souls in the next, his sporadic critique of
worldly pleasures on moral grounds, and his critique on epistemological grounds of particular sources of pleasure such as eloquence, poetry,
and beautiful women, Addison's essays on the pleasures are, in part, a
defence of certain kinds of pleasure (and some of the things which give
it to us) against the Essay. The defence begins in the opening essay
where Addison argues that the pleasures of seeing and reading make the
world more charming, prevent us from indulging in "Criminal"
pleasures, and keep us healthy. This argument underlies one of the
explicitly stated purposes of the entire series, one which challenges not
the epistemology, but the ethics of the Essay: whereas the central
imperatives of the Essay are to know and venerate god and to do our
duty, the central imperative of the essays is to pursue a particular kind
of pleasure. As Addison puts it in the opening essay, he has endeav
oured, "by several Considerations, to recommend to my Reader the
Pursuit" of the pleasures of the imagination (3: 539). It is because
Addison is here defending himself against Locke's ascetic imperatives
that, even though the Essay is so deeply written into this essay, Addison
finds he must cite not Locke but Bacon at the end of it as an authority
supporting his refined hedonism. This defence against Locke continues
as Addison proceeds to assert that the pursuit of the pleasures of the

Richard Ashcraft emphasizes this dimension of the Essay in "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's
Philosophy," in John Locke: Problems andPersepctives,ed. John Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), 194-223.
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imagination is consistent with both God's purposes for man and, in
some cases, even the pursuit of knowledge. But its most severe moment
occurs when Addison affirms these pleasures even when they are not
in the service of truth and religion: Addison is clearly not simply saying
something different from what Locke says, but arguing against him
(and Hobbes) when, in the essay on fairy writing, he objects to "men
of cold Fancies, and Philosophical Dispositions, [who] object to this
kind of Poetry, that it has not Probability enough to affect the
Imagination" (3:571). For whereas Locke is critical of those '^Doctrines,
that have been derived from no better original, than the Superstition of
a Nurse, or the Authority of an old Woman; [which] may, by length
of time, and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of Principles
in Religion, or Morality" (81), Addison affirms the poet who has an
imagination "naturally fruitful and superstitious" and who "is very well
versed in Legends and Fables, antiquated Romances, and the Traditions
of Nurses and old Women, that he may fall in with our natural
Prejudices, and humour those Notions which we have imbibed in our
Infancy" (3: 570)." Just as Addison affirms being deluded by color for
the sake of pleasure, so, because "we have all heard so many pleasing
Relations in favour of them [the particular Delusions of fairy writ
ing]...we do not care for seeing through the Falsehood, and willingly
give our selves up to so agreeable an Imposture" (3: 571-72). Though
Addison, like Aristotle and Horace, defends poetry on epistemological
grounds, and though he understands the pleasures of the imagination
to be consistent with God's general purposes for man, he is also willing
to subordinate both epistemological and religious concerns to some
thing else that he, but not Locke, values so highly:the pleasure of seeing
and of remembering and reading about what we see.
*

"For Locke, Hobbes, and Sprat as men of science who objert to fairy writing on epistemological
grounds, see M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953) 265-8. Besides the passages cited by Abrams,
see also Hobbes, "The Answer to the Preface of Gondibert," vol. 4, The English Works ofThomas
Hohbes, ed. William Moleswonh, (London: John Bohn, 1840), 451-2.
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Given the complicated relationship in which Addison's essays on the
pleasures stand to not just the epistemological vocabulary and doctrine
of the Essay but also its ethics and theology, we can see how misg;uided
it is to understand Addison's aesthetics as a product of uncritical
investments in Locke's empiricism: at the same time as he conforms
with Locke's way of thinking and writing about several issues, Addison
also departs from, revises, and defies it in fundamental respects. We can
also see the problem with understanding Addison's aesthetics as a
theory of disinterestedness. The fact that Addison neither seeks nor
finds the pleasures of food and sex when he beholds the great, the
uncommon, and the beautiful does not, as Paulson argues,^' mean that
he is disinterested, at least where being disinterested is understood as a
state in which one is in some rigorous sense beyond the pursuit of
interest and the experience of pleasure. On the contrary, because one
of Addison's deepest and most powerful interests is in a particular kind
of pleasure—the pleasure he seeks and finds when he beholds the great,
the uncommon, and the beautiful—his central recommendation in these
essays is to pursue this kind of pleasure. Although Addison clearly
distances himself from the pursuit of "sensual" pleasure in these essays,
he just as clearly recommends those pleasures which "are not so gross
as those of Sense" and places them at the heart of our experience of the
great, the beautiful, and the new. Because for Addison the central
component of aesthetic experience is pleasure, because in his writing on
the imagination his central moral imperative is to pursue a particular
kind of pleasure, because he understands this kind of pleasure as being
essential to both our fulfillment of God's purposes for us in this world
and our rewards in heaven—in short, because Addison is a refined
Christian hedonist, there is something fundamentally misguided in
constructing him as a theorist of disinterestedness.
Neither does Addison's engagement with the Essay confirm the
widespread view that the essays on the pleasures mark the birth or rise
of English aesthetics.^'' If by "aesthetics" one means the field defined by

" Paulson, The Beautiful, 50-52, 73-5. For earlier views of Addison as a theorist of
disinterestedness, see Jerome Stolnitz, "On theOrigins of 'AestheticDisinterestedness,"'/o«?72(r/
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1961): 131-43; Michael Ketcham, Transparent Designs,78.
For versions of this view, see Monk, The Sublime, 57; Tuveson, The Imagination, 92, 111;
Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'AestheticDisinterestedness,'"; Peter Kivy, "Recent Scholarship and
the British Tradition: A Logic of Taste—the First Fifty Years," in George Dickie and R. J.
Sclafani, eds..Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 627; Robert
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questions of how the beautiful affects us, what makes any object or
work of art beautiful, what faculties we use in producing art, what
constitutes a work of art, what faculties we use and what passions we
experience when we perceive the beautiful, what the value of art and its
appreciation is, then Addison's essays on the pleasures may reasonably
been seen as a study in aesthetics. But then so may all kinds of Enghsh
Renaissance and Restoration texts, such as Sidney's Defence^ the
chapters on poetry and imagination in Bacon's Advancement of
Learning, the passages on imagination in Hobbes' Leviathan and his
entire "Answer to Davenant," and some of Dryden's literary criticism.
If, however, one means by "aesthetics," as Cassirer puts it, "a new
philosophical discipline worked out and mastered according to rigorous
logical method," and "a radically new form of philosophy," examples
of which according to Cassirer are'Qmrngpcnm's Aesthetica and Kant's
Critique of Judgment, then Addison's essays do not qualify.^^ As we
have seen, Addison certainly does all kinds of things with Locke's
he simplifies it; he makes it look more consistent than it is; he
monumentalizes it by making it consistent and citing it as an authority;
he casually introduces slight modifications to its prevailing linguistic
usage with far-reaching consequences for his account of sensory
perception and the world at large; he challenges Locke's attitudes
towards and judgments of things such as poetry, states of passion and
delusion, kinds of pleasure, language, and the imagination; he develops
several highly problematical potentials and implicit claims of the Essay.
But this does not amount to the founding of a new autonomous branch
of philosophy, nor to a systematic, rigorous, logical methodology
brought to bear on questions of art and aesthetic judgment (Bacon and
Hobbes would have a stronger claim to this sort of achievement). For
Cassirer, the empiricist premises of Addison's understanding of art
made it impossible for him to have done this, for "aesthetics would not
be a science and could never become one if it confined its activity to
giving technical rules for the production of works of art or to making

Holub, "The Rise of Aesthetics in the Eighteenth Century," Comparative Literature Studies,15
(1978): 271-83;Youngren, "Binh," 282-83; Paulson, The Beautiful,1. For other rejections of this
view, see Clarence DeWitt Thorpe,"Addison and Hutcheson on the Imagination," ELH2 (1935):
215-34; Elioseff, Cultural Milieu, 161; Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market;
Rereading the History of Aesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5-6.
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, transl. Fritz Koelln and James Pettegrove
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 278. Further references are to this edition.
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psychological observations concerning its effect on the spectator. Such
activities belong to that kind of empiricism which is the exact opposite
of real philosophical insight, and from the viewpoint of method they
form the sharpest conceivable contrast to such insight" (339). But even
if we do not share Cassirer's continental contempt for empiricism, he
is correct in asserting a fundamental difference between Addison's
project and the project of founding aesthetics as a philosophical
discipline which Cassirer attributes to Baumgarten and Kant. This is
not to deny the power Addison's writing on the pleasures of the
imagination exerts over eighteenth-century English aesthetics, but only
the conception of this writing as the inauguration of a philosophical
discipline.
Addison's mastery of Locke does, however, bear out those
commentators from Samuel Johnson onwards who have understood
Addison's general project in the Spectator as one of shaping English
belief, taste, value judgments, and behavior—in short, as a project of
shaping English culture. More specifically, this mastery reveals
Addison to be promoting a culture in which what he calls "the
pleasures of the imagination" hold a central position. For it is in part
by way of his intense engagement with Locke's epistemological writing
that Addison explicitly recommends a way of life devoted to the
cultivation of interest in and the pursuit of these pleasures and the
things that provide them. In his complicated and comprehensive
response to Locke, Addison also shows how the value and worth of all
forms of knowledge, the discourses that express them, and the
empiricist theory of them can be determined on grounds of how they
are qualified to give us this pleasure. As we have seen, Addison restates
the Aristotelean and Horatian understanding of the pursuit of these
pleasures as one which is consistent with the pursuit of truth, and he
also presents the pursuit of these pleasures as one which is perfectly
consistent with what he understands to be proper religious belief and
behavior. But in some cases where it is not, Addison still recommends
it—in the name of imaginative pleasure, he explicitly sanctions various
states of delusion such as the perception of color, the belief in fairies,
and superstition in general. That is to say that, in some cases, the
commitment to pleasure overrides the commitments to truth and
proper religious belief which are emphasized in other Spectator papers
and which are more moderately asserted in these essays. Finally,
because Addison values the pleasures of the imagination so highly, he
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gives its rights back to art and the experience of perceiving it, rights
which to an important extent had been denied to it by sober philoso
phers such as Locke on epistemological and ethical grounds. That
Addison isso casual, nonconfrontational, and nonchalant in promoting
the life of imaginative pleasure through a mastery of philosophers such
as Locke who "enlightened" the world should not prevent us from
understanding him to be engaged in the business of making culture—the
true masters make the most demanding feats of strength look easy.^'

The precise ideological dimensions of Addison's cultural work have been and remain a matter
of considerable debate. For Addison as the ideologist of capitalist or bourgeois culture, see C.
S. Lewis, "Addison," in Essays on the Eighteenth Century (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1945), 13;
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiryinto a Category
o/BoKrgeois Society [1962] trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); Edward Bloom
and Lillian"Sioom Joseph Addison's Sociable Animal (Providence:Brown UniversityPress, 1971);
Edward and Lillian Bloom, "Joseph Addison: the Artist in the Mirror," in Educating the
Audience: Addison, Steele, amiEighteenth-Century Culture,ed. Edmund Leites (Los Angeles: The
William AndrewsClark Memorial Library, 1984); CaroleFabricant, "The Aesthetics andPolitics
of Landscape in the Eighteenth Century," in Studies in Eigtheenth-Century British Art and
Aesthetics, ed. Ralph Cohen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 49-81; Terry
Eagleton, The Function of Criticism (Thetford: Thetford Press, 1984); and Erin Mackie, Market
a la Mode: Fashion, Commodity, and Gender in The Tatler and The Spectator (Baltimore:Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997).
For a critique of the social history on which this view is based, see Lee Andrew Elioseff,
"J oseph Addison's Political Animal: Middle-Class Idealismin Crisis," Eigtheenth-Century Studies,
6 (1973): 372-81; J. C. D. Qixk., English Society 1688-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985);John Cannon,A rtstocntttcCent«ry (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1984).
For a critique of the view of Addison as bourgeois ideologue, and the identification of him as a
polite Whig, see J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 235-39; Nicholas Phillipson, "Politics and Politeness in the Reigns of
Anne and the Early Hanoverians," in The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1300-1800,ed.
J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 211-45; Lawrence E. Klein,
"Property and Pohteness in the Early Eighteenth-Century Whig Moralists: the Case of the
Spectator," in Early Modem Conceptions of Property, ed.John Brewer and SusanStaves (London:
Routledge, 1995), 221-33.

